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NON-INTERVENTION: TI-E LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS. By Ann
Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press, 1956. Pp. x-vi, 476. $8.00.
TnE preface of this book advises that the principle of non-intervention "is
one of the most controversial subjects in the law of nations."1 This assertion
follows from the fact that it is in the practical application of the doctrines of
intervention and non-intervention that the interaction of law and politics is
most clearly seen. To show this interaction, however, is not the purpose of
this book. Its primary purpose is to study intervention and non-intervention
strictly against their legal setting, for Professor and Mrs. Thomas believe
that "non-intervention and intervention are basic legal concepts, capable of
definition, analysis and evaluation," 2 and that political considerations have
unduly influenced and obscured the meaning of these doctrines.
Despite the subtitle, the book is not restricted to the treatment of non-
intervention in Inter-American law and relations. It's attention is broader in
that the pertinent theory and practice of the United Nations are similarly dis-
cussed. The discussion is segregated under the following headings: "Under
General International Law," "Under the Inter-American System," and "Under
the United Nations System." At almost every point the law of the United
Nations can be compared with the law of the Inter-American system, so that
the book is of interest not only to Pan-American lawyers but to other inter-
national lawyers as well. Moreover, the material is presented in a lucid and
compact fashion, and the amount of research involved was indeed enormous.
It is in matters of substance that the reviewer takes issue with the authors.
Unless the entire reasoning of the writers is properly qualified, one cannot
accept their view of intervention as being a single concept identifiable every-
where with similarity of manifestations. The authors appear to have overlooked
that from the perspective of contemporary world politics, intervention has
acquired two shades of meaning: on the one hand, it has been traditionally
applied to dictatorial interferences of one State in the affairs of another. This
technical meaning is precisely that which has been and is still used in Inter-
American relations. On the other hand, the doctrine of intervention is used
in order to block the enforcement machinery of the United Nations under
article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter-the clause that excludes from the com-
petence of the United Nations matters essentially falling within the domestic
jurisdiction of the State.3 The authors fail to bring out this fundamental
distinction; though reference is made to non-intervention of the United Na-
tions, the matter is inadequately handled. This treatment makes the doctrine
of intervention appear too simple, for it is quite safe to argue that intervention
1. P. xi.
2. Ibid.
3. See PRuss, ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE CHARTER OF THiI UNIVEJ' NATIONS




in the sense in which it is used in the United Nations Charter cannot arise in
the Inter-American system. It is thus a matter for conjecture whether the
authors have adequately laid down the foundations of the doctrines of inter-
vention and non-intervention.
My greatest doubts as to the authors' approach arise in connection with
the legality of intervention under international law. They maintain sub-
stantially that the consent of the victim State removes the act from the category
of intervention and that interventions for self-defense are not interventions at
all.4 This would seem to amount, in effect, to saying that consent and self-
defense legalize acts of intervention that would otherwise be considered
illegal. This line of reasoning clearly opens disturbing possibilites. The
view may have been more tenable under the old law in the absence of a
world organization to enforce collective security.r Even then, however, the
door was left open to all kinds of interventions for purely unilateral purposes,
making it difficult, if not impossible, to say which interventions were justified
and which were not. Under the authors' theory of self-defense much of the
intervention of the United States in Latin America can be justified as under-
taken largely to prevent European interventions. The fact still remains, how-
ever, that these interventions for self-defense were interventions from the stand-
point of the Latin American States. Similar contentions may be made regard-
ing intervention by consent, for while in some cases interventions by the United
States were permitted by treaty, as in Panama and Cuba, the character of
intervention still existed from the point of view of Panama and Cuba, though
perhaps not from the standpoint of the United States.6
There is surely a stubborn contradiction in the attempt to include within
the scope of intervention "enforcement actions" of the States acting either col-
lectively or through an international organization.7 To reconcile this conflict
the authors speak of collective intervention which, significantly, is extended
to enforcement actions of the United Nations.8 But surely if the United
Nations takes enforcement action against a State for violations of international
law, the action thus taken cannot properly be characterized as collective inter-
vention. Technically speaking, the term "intervention" can apply only to
dictatorial interferences of a State in the internal or external conduct of another,
provided the latter exercises its sovereignty within the framework of the law.
The very nature of an enforcement action would seem to imply that the State
against which action is taken has violated the law, and it can scarcely be sug-
gested that a State that violates international law is protected by the very same
law it has transgressed. An enforcement action against a wrongdoer vindicates
the authority of international law, and, from the standpoint of the interests
4. Pp. 91-97, 79-85. This view also appears in reference to civil strife, p. 215.
5. Fenwick, Has the Specter of Intervention Been Laid in Latin America? 50 Abr.
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of the world society, it makes no difference whether such action is undertaken
by the international organization or by a group of States.9
It is of course quite possible that the difficulty in accepting the conception
of collective intervention arises from the fact that we are nowhere told whether
the authors are using the word "intervention" in a loose and nontechnical
sense, or in the rather restrictive and technical connotation. At one instance
we are informed that intervention is any action of a State designed to influence
the will of another.10 The unavoidable implication is that intervention is being
used in a broad and nontechnical sense. Yet in another part of the book the
authors make a distinction between intervention and interference," the con-
trolling element of the distinction being the existence of coercion in the former.
In this instance Professor and Mrs. Thomas appear to be using intervention
as a technical term. Their preference for the nontechnical connotation is, how-
ever, unmistakably clear throughout the book. The main objection to the non-
technical connotation is that it fails to consider adequately the dictatorial
character of intervention. From Vattel onwards the dictatorial character of
intervention has been significantly singled out, and even Latin American writers,
who have spoken most vigorously against intervention, regard the dictatorial
element as being an essential element of the doctrine.: 2 The constant hesitation
of the authors in respect to the context in which they used the word "inter-
vention" is disconcerting and misleading, and it is clear from the standpoint
of their own definition that the term "collective intervention" is probably
incorrect.
It is not easy to regard as fully acceptable the authors' treatment of the
United Nations practice. They sharply question the practice of the United
Nations, where "the legal outlook, the legal method, and legal procedure.
have fallen by the wayside.' 3 They refer to this practice as the "breakdown
in respect for international law" in the United Nations.' 4 This assertion pro-
ceeds from the questionable assumptions that the function of the United
Nations can be rigidly classified as legal and that international law is not
adequately promoted unless traditional legal methods are employed to settle
controversies between States. What seems to have particularly impressed
the authors are the political activities of the United Nations, and it is apparently
in this connection that they deplore the use of nonlegal methods. Obviously
they view the subject from the standpoint of traditional international law. Yet
there is a curious contradiction between this approach and their treatment of
9. It should be recalled that article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not impair
the States' right of "collective self-defense."
10. P. 71.
11. P. 96.
12. 1 PODEsT. COSTA, DEIECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 96 (3d ed. 1955); YEPEs,
PHILOSOPHIE DO PANAMIRICANISME FT ORGANISATION DE LA PAIX c. 22 (1945) ; ACCIOLy,





the Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Novem-
ber 30, 1950. In this regard, the authors go to great lengths to prove the legality
of the resolution and, in so doing, rely on the same nonlegal methods to which
they so vigorously object.' 5 WAhat they fail to tell us is that within the United
Nations a whole new system of law has developed and that inadequate tra-
ditional channels have not been resorted to because the function of the United
Nations may demand the use of legal, political, social or economic action.'16
This practice undoubtedly does violence to the cherished preconceptions of the
defenders of traditional legal doctrines, but its urgency is nevertheless real.
There are other aspects of the book that call for comment. The difficult
questions of recognition 17 and asylum Is as forms of intervention are treated
in an inconclusive manner and one that perhaps unduly simplifies the nature
of the problem. Whether or not recognition is a form of intervention depends
largely upon the theory of recognition to which one subscribes. In this con-
nection, it is a familiar proposition that the theory of recognition in interna-
tional law has been greatly influenced by the constitutive and the declaratory
doctrines.' The constitutive view maintains that a State comes into being as
a subject of international law through the process of recognition, and thus no
legal relations can exist with a political community prior to recognition. The
element of interference is clearly apparent in this theory, for in fact it amounts
to making the existence of a State dependent upon the unilateral action of
other States. On the other hand, under the declaratory view recognition merely
declares the fact that a State exists. The State comes into being by fulfilling
the conditions of statehood and not by the action of other States. It can readily
be seen, therefore, that the declaratory view cannot be regarded as a form of
intervention. This distinction between the two views of recognition is not ade-
quately made in the book, and one naturally wonders how the authors have
arrived at the conclusion that recognition is a form of intervention without
any further qualification. Moreover, since the Charter of Bogot6. of 1948 adheres
to the declaratory view,20 it would necessarily follow that intervention by way
of recognition is absent from Inter-American law. Yet this aspect of the prob-
lem is nowhere to be found despite its significance for the development of
recognition law in the Western Hemisphere.
Nor is the discussion in regard to asylum any more conclusive. The view
that territorial asylum is a form of intervention is wholly unacceptable. If it
proceeds, as it does, from the exercise of territorial sovereignty on the part
of the State granting asylum, the element of interference or even coercion is
15. Pp. 172-76.
16. Sohn, The Impact of the United Nations on International Law, 46 PRoc. Am.
Soc', INT'L L. 104 (1952).
17. P. 241.
18. Pp. 391-99.
19. LAUTERPAcET, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 38-42 (1947).
20. Article 9 of the Charter of Bogoti says: "The political existence of the State
is independent of recognition by other States ......
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conspicuously absent, so that it cannot properly fall within either definition
of intervention.21 It is in respect to diplomatic asylum that the authors' whole
conception of intervention as "any action of a State designed to influence the
will of another" breaks down altogether and loses all its force; for though the
Latin American governments and writers were greatly instrumental in estab-
lishing the principle of non-intervention, they have been similarly instrumental
in establishing diplomatic asylum as a doctrine sui generis. This further
illustrates the proposition that intervention is a technical term and that the
absence of dictatorial interference removes an action from the category of
intervention. Moreover, the authors' statement, in dealing with the celebrated
Haya de la Torre Cases, that "as for diplomatic asylum, the Court concluded
that it was an illegal intervention,"22 although not inaccurate per se, fails to
bring out the true position. Actually, the International Court of Justice was
limiting its ruling to the unilateral qualification of the offense by the State
granting asylum, which would be an act of intervention unless its legal basis
were clearly established in each specific case.2
3
The foregoing observations are not intended to detract in any way from the
merits of the work. There can be no doubt that Professor and Mrs. Thomas
have dealt exhaustively with the law of intervention and non-intervention. One
should look upon the book as a valuable contribution to the solution of a prob-
lem that has greatly disturbed the development of international law.
MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORAt
STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE. By Richard N. Gardner. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xxiv, 424. $6.75.
IT is a rare joy to come across a book as appealing to the layman as it is to
the specialist. This is such a book. Historians, economists, political scientists
and lawyers will learn more from it than from many an esoteric volume on the
same subject. And the layman will begin to understand the intricacies of inter-
national economic negotiations and the monotonous succession of high hopes
and bitter disillusionment which have marked the bewildering proliferation of
international economic agreements and institutions in the postwar era.
The curtain rises with the blazing trumpets of the Atlantic Charter in
August 1941 and falls on the quiet burial of the proposed Charter for an In-
21. GARCrA-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGET c. 4
(1956).
22. P. 397.
23. The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] T.C.J. Rep. 275. See also Garcia-
Mora, The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case and The Doctrine of Human Rights, 37
VA. L. R v. 927 (1951).
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